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Introduction 
In this book, many aspects of modernisation have been elaborated, including cultural and 
ideological. In this chapter, we will approach modernisation as a political concept, and map the 
discussion around it in Russian media texts.  
 
Modernisation was one of the political key concepts during Dmitri Medvedev’s era as President of 
Russia (2008–2012). Following the financial crisis of 2008 that severely harmed Russian economy, 
it is not surprising that Medvedev’s understanding of modernisation was focused on economy. He 
included the concept in his political rhetoric from the beginning of his term, but the quest for 
modernisation intensified during the next years. This pattern is rather traditional in the Russian 
political discourse. Already in Soviet times, inauguration of a new leader entailed new political 
concepts. By introducing new words, the leaders legitimated their ultimate position and underlined 
the significance of the shift of power. Intellectual historian Quentin Skinner has described this as a 
political innovation (Skinner 1999), and modernisation in the Russian context can be seen as an 
example of such conceptual change. 
 
One can see a clear peak in the usage of the word in the years 2009–2011, after which it is used less 
actively both in the political rhetoric and in the media (Pietiläinen 2016). The sudden ‘rise and fall’ 
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of the concept can be interpreted in many ways, but most certainly it is evident that the usage of the 
concept in media is seamlessly linked to the political rhetoric of the leadership.  
 
Figure 1. The frequency of the use of the words modernizatsiia, innovatsiia and tsivilizatsiia in 2000-2014 in Russian 
media (source: Integrum, central media). 
 
In order to place modernisation concept into a broader context, we present here visualisations of 
frequencies in comparison with two other widely used concepts. Table 1 shows the frequency of the 
modernisation in comparison to innovation and civilisation. What we see there differs significantly 
from the situation in Western countries. In media texts which follow political rhetoric the 
proportion of the equivalent words is quite different innovation being the far most frequent word. 
Another interesting word in this context is civilisation [tsivilizatsiia]. For illustration, the figures 
below demonstrate the frequency of usage of the three words on the Russian and Finnish internet.1 
                                                          
1 The Finnish Internet was taken as an example for language reasons. The English words innovation, 
modernisation and civilisation resemble partly the equivalent words in other language which may 
distort the reliability of the search. All the Finnish words innovaatio, modernisaatio and  sivilisaatio 
differ from the English ones in spelling which makes possible to get exact search results.  
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Figure 2. The share of the usage of the words innovation, modernisation and civilisation in the 
Russian and Finnish Internet according to Yandex (1.3.2015) 
 
In this chapter our focus is on the attitudes of the people towards modernisation, not just 
modernisation as a political concept. An earlier study (Kim & Mustajoki 2013) demonstrates a 
rather vague understanding of modernisation among Russian students. In another article (Mustajoki 
& Steksova 2014) the question was analysed on the basis of a large text material from Russian 
media. This study showed a great number of instances in which obstacles in the modernisation 
process were described in a way we call ‘single-explanation reasoning’. In other words, the author 
of the text or the person (s)he refers to argues that there is a certain concrete thing which prevents 
the modernisation of the country from happening. 
 
The main research questions of this chapter are how the preconditions for modernisation are 
presented in the media, and what are the most frequent reasons seen hindering the modernisation. 
With these questions we aim to trace the reasoning around the concept, that is, which political and 
societal demands modernisation is seen to legitimate.  
Finland 
innovation modernisation civilisation
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There is also a further ground in paying attention to the ‘single-explanation reasoning’. It has been 
argued by Russian sociolinguists Iuri Prokhorov and Iosif Sternin (2006: 67-68) that such an 
approach to the world is one of the basic features of the Russian mentality. Therefore, we think that 
by studying the modernisation discourse it is possible to examine whether this claim works when 
considering attitudes to a politically and economically focal concept.  
 
Modernisation as a political concept 
Modernisation in Russian, modernizatsiia, is a concept with rather wide meaning. After it was 
attached to Medvedev’s political program (Medvedev 2009; 2011), the political and economic 
connotations became primary, and at the same time the concept grew inseparable from Medvedev’s 
person.  
 
It is not insignificant that Dmitri Medvedev chose to use this particular concept to introduce his 
political program. Medvedev, who appeared more liberal than his predecessor, deliberately used a 
loanword with future-oriented connotations. This marked a shift from the traditional way of 
speaking about renewing or reforming certain spheres of technology and society to a more 
comprehensive way of approaching the theme.  
 
According to a Russian dictionary from 2002 modernisation means to ‘change something in 
accordance to contemporary requirements and taste’ (Kuznetsov et al 2002). Also, it is often 
translated into Russian with a more general meaning of reneval [obnovlenie]. Modernisation as a 
state level concept stresses firstly the comprehensiveness of the ‘renewal’, and secondly, the 
process-like characteristics that it carries with it.  
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As such the Russian word modernizatsiia has (as has the English equivalent modernisation) two 
meanings. It refers both to ‘happening’, the process of modernisation itself, and to ‘active doing’ in 
order to reach a certain stage which can be called as modernisation. When Medvedev was speaking 
of modernisation, he stressed the latter meaning. When an observer or researcher is talking about it, 
(s)he may have in mind the concrete political measures but the main focus lies obviously on what is 
really happening. 
 
A reasonable way to look at political concepts is to study the situation in which they were 
presented. The reasoning behind Medvedev’s political discourse can be traced by looking at the 
moment of his inauguration more closely. Modernisation was obviously intended to solve structural 
problems of Russian economy that were revealed in full scale after the financial crisis of 2008 and 
of which many remained open since then. Russia was and still is to a large extent dependent on raw 
material exports. As a matter of fact, the financial crisis was the first real test for Russia’s economy 
in a situation when the whole international business suffered from a severe crisis. Technological 
development had not reached desired level in Russia, and the demographic situation would soon 
lead to lack of work force and capable professionals (see e.g. Korotayev & Khalturina 2008). 
’Modernisation talk’ was introduced as a frame within which the problems could be discussed in a 
future-oriented and optimistic way. 
 
Similar motivation can be seen behind many previous political innovations. Most evident point of 
comparison is Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika (re-building), which was introduced in the year 
1985 to reform the Soviet Union’s stagnated economy. Gorbachev could not refer to forthcoming 
political changes with previously used word acceleration [uskorenie] – the concept was too heavily 
related to his predecessor Iuri Andropov. Talking about reform [reforma] would have been too 
radical in the political discourse of the time (Ruutu 2010). Although historical comparison is not 
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always coherent, in this case it helps to see the broader picture of political rituals: the shift in power 
needs to be marked, and often the most useful way to do it is to engage new political slogans. 
  
Medvedev, who is younger than his predecessor Vladimir Putin2, became soon famous for his 
engagement for technology. In 2009, Medvedev founded the innovation centre Skolkovo near 
Moscow. It was planned to become the leading business platform for high technologies and 
companies and to enhance entrepreneurship. Medvedev was among the first Russian leaders to use 
channels of social media, like blogging and tweeting in communication (Moen-Larsen 2013). At the 
same time, the government’s control over media and Internet has been increasing, most 
significantly after 2011 (Kramer 2014). This should not be understood as a discrepancy in the 
official policy: Medvedev’s demand for flexible communication is directly linked to the economic 
growth instead of strengthening the civil society.  
 
As mentioned, for Medvedev the core constituent of modernisation was technology. He spoke also 
of the important role of democracy in this process but said that it ‘already exists’ in Russia. He also 
emphasized that Russia has its own way to build democracy, which differs from that in the West 
and China (cf. e.g.  Sakwa 2011, Nygren 2012).  Later this view gained a status of an official 
doctrine in the concept of Russia’s own path / way [osobyi put’ Rossii].  
 
The quest for Russia to follow its ‘own path’ is traditionally linked to the discussion of 
modernisation of the country. As Olga Malinova, Russian political scientist, has pointed out, the 
competition between modernisation and the ‘own path’ discourse has been present already two 
                                                          
2 Medvedev is born in 1965, and Vladimir Putin 1952. Putin’s first and second terms took place 
2000-2008, and the third term started in 2012. 
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hundred years. The roots of this tradition are in the 1830s Slavophile thought that stressed the idea 
of organic development of the nation as a whole. This view emerged as a response to the 
modernisation of Russia that was promoted by the so called Westerners (zapadniki). In the 
Slavophile current of thought it was seen crucial that Russia should not be ‘mirroring’ the Western 
models but develop spontaneously (Malinova 2008). According to historian Alexander Yanov, the 
pattern of reforms and counter-reforms has determined the Russian ideological history (Yanov 
1978).  
 
Here, we need to note that an overall understanding of history as cyclical process is an 
oversimplification. This pattern in the post-Soviet context has been analysed above in chapter 4 by 
Kåre Johan Mjør, so we refrain from discussing in it detail. But it’s interesting to see that today the 
idea of these divisions has become less clear-cut: the ‘Russian way’ can be understood in cultural 
terms, and economic modernisation is not seen as opposing it. In opinion polls conducted by 
Levada Center, Russians have given a clear preference to their ‘own way’ instead of ‘European 
path’ or ‘Soviet path’ since the year 2000 (Levada-center 2014) when they were asked which way 
Russia should choose in the future. These polls give grounds to expect that the historical context of 
modernisation would also be acknowledged in the media texts of 21th century. 
 
’Single-explanation reasoning’  
The Russians themselves have been active in describing their mentality and typical features. 
Psychologist Nadezhda Lebedeva in her chapter in this volume claims that certain characteristics of 
Russian mentality are obstacles in effective innovation policy of the country. The most 
comprehensive list of mental features of the Russians is given in a book by sociolinguists Iuri 
Prokhorov and Iosif Sternin (2006: 67–68). The list includes, among others, the Russian type of 
collectivism called sobornost, warmth in social interaction, need for ideals, high degree of impulse, 
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preference of justice to obedience to the law, national self-criticism and historical collective 
patience. 
 
There are two features of Russian mentality which may be seen as background factors for single-
explanation reasoning. These are the belief in centralised solution of all problems and the trust in 
quick and simple settlement of complex problems. Let us have a closer look at how Prokhorov and 
Sternin explain these constituents of Russian mentality. 
 
Behind the belief in centralised solution of problems is the reasoning of the responsibility of ‘them’ 
for everything, not only for the prosperity of the country but also the well-being of people. ‘They’ is 
personalised as tsar, president or an abstract concept of those who have the power. The main logic 
is that the solution is outside and above, not in people themselves. ‘They’ have the opportunity, 
capability and power to make life better. The attitude shakes internal irresponsibility of citizens and 
diminishes their interest in democracy. 
 
Trust in quick and simple settlements of complex problems is a feature characteristic not only for 
ordinary people but also for the leaders. As a matter of fact, leaders’ initiatives of this kind have 
good response among citizens. There is a long list of single solutions for all big problems, from 
collectivisation and electrification in the first years of the Soviet Union to the ban of alcohol and the 
perestroika in the late 1980s. The inspiration and enthusiasm caused by the new solution of all 
problems disappear sooner or later, usually soon, which leads to disappointment. However, this 
does not hinder people to grasp the next new attempt to do the same. 
 
In the context of modernisation the Russian way of thinking goes like this: modernisation of Russia 
is needed but it will fail as all other previous attempts to reform the country. However, it could 
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succeed if x would take place. Consequently, single-explanation reasoning reflects a great 
scepticism towards the possibilities of modernisation. Scepticism and heterogeneous views are 
present also in the opinions on the role of the state and future paths of the nation as shown in the 
surveys by the Levada center. 
 
The data and the method 
In order to find out at the various preconditions for modernisation we collected data from central 
Russian newspapers within the time frame when modernisation was expected to be discussed in the 
media. To access wide range of media texts we used Integrum database, which is one of the largest 
in the world including almost all Russian contemporary newspaper archives to this day (see e.g. 
Mustajoki 2006). To narrow down the data we took into consideration only the central press, i.e. 
more than 350 newspapers and journals published in Moscow and St Petersburg. Even though 
television is the utmost primary media source for Russians, central newspapers are still popular. In 
the recent years, it has become more common to read the news online.3 In this chapter we have not 
sorted the publications further because our purpose is not to compare publications to each other but 
rather to approach the data collection as a whole.  
 
                                                          
3 For 60 % of Russians, TV is the primary source of information. The main information sources are 
central TV (among the three most popular information sources for 84 % of Russians), followed by 
regional TV (41 %), central newspapers (30 %) and online news media (29 %) (Nisbet 2015, 12). 
See also the previous chapter by Katja Lehtisaari for more detailed information on media 
consumption in Russia. 
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The time frame of the study is from 1 January 2011 until 30 September 2014. Most of the texts are 
published during 2011 and 2012. The chosen time frame covers the last years of Medvedev 
presidency and first two years of Putin’s third term, and this change has certain consequences also 
in the media coverage.   
 
In order to find ’single-explanation’ examples among the total number of 94500 occurrences of the 
word modernizatsiia, special searching tools were employed. First, we took into consideration only 
contexts with reference to the modernisation of the country, not to a certain branch such as 
transport, education, or army, for example. So, an obligatory condition for desired context was 
expression modernisation of Russia [modernizatsiia Rossii] or of the country [modernizatsiia 
strany].  
 
Moreover, cases of ‘single-explanation’ were fished by giving further conditions for the search: 
expressions like is possible only if [vozmozhna tol’ko esli] or for modernisation it is necessary [to] 
[dlia modernizatsii neobhodimo]. We excluded from the material purely scientific articles, official 
documents and texts that were written about Russian modernisation in history. With these 
restrictions, we were able to collect approximately 100 text passages for a detailed analysis. All 
examples were equally important regardless of who stands behind the texts and opinions. The 
starting point was that media texts reflect the overall attitude among people not necessary among 
wide public but among influential actors of the society. 
 
As to the Russian media climate, we have to make one further comment. As was already mentioned, 
Russian media sphere is dominated by television, and the main TV channels are either 
governmentally owned or owned by businesses loyal to the government. During last few years the 
governmental control over mass media has tightened (see e.g. Kramer 2014). At the same time 
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many media publishers struggle with economic problems, some of them caused by the overall 
economic decline, and some of them stemming from legislative changes like those that restrict 
foreign ownership of the media and the proportion of advertisement sales. 
 
Despite the multi-faceted problems in the media sphere, we consider our primary material both 
credible and sufficient sample of media texts. The discussion in printed media within the time frame 
of this study could be described as pluralistic. There were various views presented and the 
argumentation extended beyond the official rhetoric.   
 
Analysis of the data 
The data offers a variety of explanations why modernisation cannot take place before a crucial 
factor x will be materialised. The media texts rarely explain the meaning of modernisation as such, 
but in most cases it is implicitly present. We concentrate on the preconditions given to 
modernisation, which often implicitly tell also about the interpretations of modernisation on a 
general level, as well as of the attitude that writers have towards it. We divide the explanations into 
three major categories: economic preconditions, preconditions related to education and science, and 
political preconditions. Additionally, as the fourth category, we will consider instances where the 
‘Russian way’ is explicitly discussed together with the prospects of modernisation.   
 
Economic preconditions 
 
Clearly, the most common way to address preconditions for modernisation is to name economic 
challenges. Writers either see modernisation as purely economic phenomenon or interpret the 
concept more widely but see the obstacles to it mainly economic. It is argued that modernisation 
will not take place without sufficient investments, trade diversification or technologic innovations, 
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among others. This category of preconditions is most closely linked to the official leadership, 
because these themes are frequently mentioned by president Medvedev, especially during the years 
2009–2011. In January 2011, Medvedev held a speech in the World Economic Forum where he 
listed ten most critical aspects of modernisation. These included the need for innovations, qualified 
education, and development of IT technology. In our data sample the reflections from this speech 
can be seen, which is not that surprising. The ideas launched by the president were presented by 
various actors and authors, but the voice of the business sector was the most dominant. In an article 
in Izvestiia the business terminology was transferred to other areas of the society: for modernisation 
of the country it was important to create ‘conditions for civilised competition of people, ideas, 
societal initiatives, programmes’4. 
 
To many, the modernisation of Russian economy means primarily economic diversification. The 
raw-material dependency is acknowledged as the most decisive problem of the national economy, 
and this should be fought with modernisation. In the Medvedev’s initiative the most concrete 
suggestions to make the economy more diverse were to attract investments to Russia and to boost 
Russian innovations. Both suggestions seem to be well met in the data sample and can be presented 
as ‘single-explanation’. The examples were mainly found in newspapers that deal with 
                                                          
4 ”Реальная модернизация страны возможна только через создание условий для 
цивилизованной конкуренции — людей, идей, общественных инициатив, программ.” 
(Izvestiia, 2 February 2013) 
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economicquestions. Although it was not always elaborated whether the writers mean foreign or 
domestic investments, they were nevertheless presented as being of critical importance.5 
 
The need for innovations is mentioned often. However, in the sample texts, it is not always 
considered necessary to explain what sorts of innovations are needed or the concrete means how 
they should be produced. One article dealing specifically with innovations started with an eternal 
question: ‘If we are so bright, then why are we so poor?’6. Innovations are often understood as a 
feature of private sector, and therefore closely linked with entrepreneurship. If, then, modernisation 
is understood as enhancing innovations and entrepreneurship, the obstacles named include 
corruption and weak institutions. This is closely linked to the political preconditions, but is also 
significant factor from the point of view of reaching the economic goals of modernisation. 
 
It is clear that innovations, in whatever sphere of economics, arise from knowledge and expertise, 
from human resources. This brings us to the next set of preconditions for modernisation, namely 
education and science. 
                                                          
5 ”Снижение инвестиционной активности частного бизнеса продолжается, но, как 
выясняется, задачу модернизации страны, кроме него, решать некому.” (Ekspert, 19 
December 2011)  
”По словам Анатолия Аксакова, главы Ассоциации региональных банков России (АРБР), 
проблемы, с которыми лизинговая отрасль столкнулась в настоящее время, ставят под 
сомнение сам этот вид деятельности, который крайне необходим нашей стране для решения 
задач модернизации страны, развития инвестиционной деятельности.” (Rossiiskaia biznes-
gazeta, 25 October 2011) 
6 ”Если мы такие умные, то почему такие бедные” (Moskovskie novosti, 27 April 2011) 
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Education and science 
 
One distinctive category of preconditions was those texts that emphasized science and education. 
These topics were clearly stated by Medvedev, and they are strongly linked to the economic point 
of view: investing for quality of education and science will help in developing innovations and 
technologies, which then will boost the economy. This linkage is evident, because many of the texts 
were promoting engineering and technological education in particular. However, these 
preconditions are more clearly than other economic factors related to the 'human factor': social and 
also demographic questions were discussed.  
These preconditions are clearly future-oriented. The debate concerns mainly the young 
professionals as well as students, who determine the future of the country: we (the country) should 
create ‘necessary’ conditions for young scientists7 and ’normal’ conditions for specialist education.8    
 
When discussing education, especially higher education, the authors point out many structural 
problems, such as ‘brain drain’ from Russia. This, together with larger demographic stagnation, is a 
true challenge for Russia. Enhancing the quality of education or providing more jobs in the field of 
science and technology does not help if the young people still desire to leave their country.9 
                                                          
7 ”Модернизация страны напрямую связана с технологическим прорывом, который станет 
возможным, если мы будем создавать необходимые условия для молодых ученых.” 
(Uchitel’skaia gazeta, 9 November 2010) 
8 ”Можно ли реально ставить вопрос о модернизации страны, если мы изначально не 
обеспечиваем нормальных условий для подготовки специалистов?” (Zavtra, 15 March 2012) 
9 ”Россия сегодня переживает колоссальную 'утечку мозгов’, тех, которые необходимы для 
модернизации страны.” (Moskovskii Komsomolets, 17 January 2012) 
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One interesting debate reflected the attitudes towards education during the winter 2011–2012. In 
December 2011 the Russian government announced a list of 93 professions that are ‘necessary for 
modernisation’ (e.g. Moskovskie novosti, 8 December 2011). The listing was not only rhetorical, but 
included a promise of a higher scholarship for students of nominated fields. The initiative was 
widely reported in the press where it also evoked criticism. Representatives of other professions, 
such as doctors and teachers, were later highlighted in the press – they, too, are necessary for 
modernisation and deserved recognition (e.g. Znamia, 15 April 2012). In this debate it is interesting 
to compare the government’s and media’s interpretations of modernisation: the first seems to use 
modernisation in the meaning of technological modernisation, while news texts have adopted the 
term in a broader meaning. For media representatives modernisation means success and future of 
the society as a whole while for government it is more of a synonym for economic growth. The 
debate over necessary professions makes the distinction more visible.     
 
Political preconditions 
 
The data offered also texts that named political preconditions for modernisation. What we call 
political preconditions included pleas for democracy, mobilisation of the people, and political will 
of the leadership. The texts also pointed out the successes and flaws of the current government. 
These texts approached modernisation either as more political process by nature or suggested that 
the economic goals of modernisation cannot be met without political changes. 
 
Among the texts there were samples both supporting and opposing the ruling leadership. Some 
writers expressed their support by stating that only the party in power, United Russia, could ensure 
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the success of modernisation. This statement was linked to the post of the president: that only 
Vladimir Putin could have the ability to modernise the country (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 December 
2011). Also the significance of the State Duma (Itogi, 28 November 2011) and the leading position 
of the party itself were stressed – although the latter was also promoted by president Medvedev.10 
 
Direct criticism towards the leadership was not commonplace, but it existed. For instance, in an 
article in Krestyanskaia Rus’ democracy is seen as the precondition for modernisation11, but the 
main point is expressed already in the headline of the article: Under this rule modernisation is 
impossible12. 
 
Democracy is perhaps the most interesting precondition in this category. This, too, reflects 
Medvedev’s speeches – even though in his initiative from the year 2009 democracy was stressed 
much more than two years later (cf. Medvedev 2009 and Medvedev 2011). In our data, democracy 
or democratisation are mentioned in various forms and from various standpoints but not very 
frequently. One explanation could be that the ‘democratisation discourse’ alongside with the 
                                                          
10 ”Президент Дмитрий Медведев считает, что лидерство "Единой России" после выборов 
необходимо сохранить не ради самого лидерства, а для продолжения курса на 
модернизацию страны.” (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 November 2011) 
11 ”Именно в рамках общества модерна формируется нация как сообщество социально 
равных и культурно однородных людей. Эта нация, будучи источником власти, сама и 
формирует эту власть в рамках некоторых демократических процедур. Поэтому если мы 
говорим о модернизации России, то она возможна исключительно на путях демократии. 
Всё это прямо противоположно тому, что мы сейчас имеем в нашем обществе.” (Krestianskaia 
Rus’, 16 November 2011) 
12 ”При этой власти модернизация невозможна” 
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modernisation talk had been decreasing on the level of leadership, which then resonated in the 
media texts. The change in discourse could partly explain the shift from western-style 
modernization talk towards the idea of national, Russian modernisation. 
 
In some cases, democracy was linked to institutions and the structural change of the political 
environment. The institutions are seen as crucial, but also the involvement of people, who are 
genuinely interested and active.13 Democratic change is not only approached on the governmental 
level but also meant to encourage individuals to feel responsible for a common cause. This is linked 
with the idea of stronger civil society and support for the current political project. In the political 
rhetoric this is a way to show that individuals matter – a reasoning that was used in a similar way 
already by Gorbachev. In some texts it is expected that the people themselves need to understand 
the value of their participation, but in other instances it was seen more as a top-down process, 
engaging people from above.14 
                                                          
13 “К подобным рассуждениям следует присоединить крайне низкую эффективность 
большинства демократических институтов, ведь в реальности они не влияют ни на политику 
властей, ни на социальную защищенность граждан, уровень жизни, масштабы коррупции, 
реальное обеспечение личных и коллективных прав граждан. И все чаще президенту России 
приходится говорить о том, что жизненно необходимы адекватная новым вызовам времени 
реконструкция системы власти, расширение реальной демократии, способной подтягивать 
толковых, неравнодушных людей для решения серьезных проблем модернизации России.” 
(Moskovskaia pravda, 10 August 2011) 
 
14 ”Между тем никакой модернизации страны, в том числе и экономики, быть не может, 
если активные граждане не займутся собственной страной, вместо того чтобы заниматься 
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‘The Russian way’ 
 
In some texts modernisation is presented as a process that cannot take place unless the nature of the 
project as ‘Russian one’ is correctly understood. This aspect is described both as the source for the 
future success and a potential danger if not understood correctly. The basic argument is that 
modernisation needs to follow Russian traditions and not imitate Western, Chinese or other 
developments, because Russia has its own peculiar history and structure. According to political 
scientist Christer Pursiainen, both Putin and Medvedev have embraced the idea of Russia creating 
something new and not copying the Western model of modernisation. The main difference between 
the Western and Russian modernisation concept is that political realisation process of modernisation 
should be based on Russia’s national political culture, which ideally means ‘political wholeness’ 
through centralisation and personification – and not liberal democracy, which would be expected 
from the Western point of view (Pursiainen 2012, 1-7). 
 
The traditional discourse of the (Western-style) modernisation and the ‘Russian way’ is represented 
also in our data. In the newspaper texts, however, the argumentation of modernisation being 
Russian project is distinctive from the traditional discourse and could be related to the common way 
of speaking about Russia’s uniqueness. This discourse does not resemble the old competition 
                                                          
построением новых мифов и таким образом уходить от реальности.” (Profil’, 23 November 
2009) 
”Если в работу по модернизации страны не включится народ, она не состоится. Деньги 
разворуют, страна не слезет с нефтегазовой иглы, а армия и флот останутся без новейшего 
вооружения.” (Krestianskaia Rus’, 4 April 2012) 
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between the Westerners and Slavophiles. As political scientist Lilia Shevtsova writes, the 
‘uniqueness of Russia’ is one of the old stereotypes that are often used to justify the current Russian 
system (Shevtsova 2010). 
 
Speaking about Russia as something completely different emphasizes the country’s history and the 
mentality of the people. At the same time it stresses significance of the ‘Russian values’, which 
often translates to the traditional (orthodox) values15.In the context of modernisation, the reference 
to national approach as the only successful one does not always include the juxtaposition to other 
countries, but sometimes they are also explicitly mentioned, and the points of comparison are 
‘America’ and China.16 
 
                                                          
15 “России надо вернуться на свой вековой самобытный путь, насильственно прерванный в 
феврале и октябре 1917 г., путь, которым шли наши предки. Да, он был тяжёлым и 
тернистым, но одновременно - великим и славным, а самое главное он был путём к Богу. 
Только вернувшись на этот самобытный путь, основываясь на тысячелетних духовных 
ценностях нашего народа, используя положительный мировой опыт во благо Отчизны, 
возможны и подлинные реформы, и подлинная модернизация страны.” (Russkii dom, 1 
March 2011) 
16 ”Модернизация России должна осуществляться не по-американски и не по-китайски, а по-
русски – иначе из неё действительно ничего не выйдет. Модернизация без вестернизации – 
такова её наиболее ёмкая формула. Конкретно говоря, это означает, что экономика и 
технологии должны у нас служить человеку и духу, а не наоборот. (Literaturnaia gazeta, 26 
January 2011) 
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In addition to the traditional idea of Russia’s uniqueness there is another way to interpret the 
emphasis on the ‘Russian way’. It might show that the nature of the modernisation project had 
changed along the way: by 2011 it was already clear that modernisation is not taking place as 
effectively as it was expected (see e.g. Aron 2010, Shevtsova 2010), so it was politically safer for 
the regime to turn the emphasis inwards. As the modernisation process was not turning Russia into 
“Westernized” liberal economy, it became tempting to point out that this kind of change was never 
intended. The ‘Russian way’ without evident role model was more flexible when defending political 
goals.  
 
It can also be argued that referring to the ‘Russian way’ is a signal of the return of conservative 
values that happened after the Medvedev era. The conservative turn (see e.g. Engström 2014) was 
taken in the beginning of Putin’s return to president in 2012.   
 
Interestingly, in our sample there were also voices that opposed the necessity of the ‘own path’ 
view – and still followed the single-explanation pattern. Some media outlets quoted opinion 
expressed originally by economist Igor Iyurgens that it is Russians who disturb modernisation 
(Literaturnaia gazeta 23 January 2013; Moskovskii Komsomolets 7 November 2012). According to 
Iyurgens, archaic Russians value community higher than individuals, which means that they are not 
“mature” for modernisation to take place. Similar view was expressed by Andrey Konchalovsky, 
Russian film director, who stated in April 2012 that the modernisation of Russia cannot happen 
before modernisation of Russian mentality takes place (Ogonek 27 June 2011). 
 
There were some examples that mentioned international partners and cooperation as the main 
preconditions for modernisation. European Union and China were mentioned as primary partners 
(RBK daily, 10 October 2013) – as well as the Commonwealth of Independent Countries, the 
21 
 
Eurasian Customs Union and ‘countries that are loyal to Russian interests’ (Profil’ 21 November 
2011). It could be noted, however, that in these texts modernisation was seen as an economic 
project, whereas texts stressing Russian mentality or uniqueness approached the concept in a more 
comprehensive way.    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Modernisation of Russia was a political key concept of one specific time and place, clearly linked to 
the Medvedev’s leadership. The concept was used in more diverse contexts than in which it was 
originally introduced. Introduction of a new key concept followed the rhetoric pattern of 
Khrushchev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and other Soviet and Russian leaders. Medvedev chose to use the 
concept of modernisation in order to stress a new phase in the political culture.   
 
Medvedev’s use of the concept of modernisation during his presidency was closely related to the 
meanings of economic modernisation. However, interpretations in media texts are very diverse and 
even contradictory. For example, it was stated that modernisation cannot take place under the 
current regime while others argued that modernisation can be successful only when pursued by the 
current government. This – admittedly blunt – example describes well the power of the concept as a 
tool of political legitimation: overall significance of modernisation is not disputed. It is rather seen 
as a necessity, and therefore the legitimation needed is addressed towards the precondition. Also, 
when the concept is seen as a key concept, there is no need to elaborate the meaning of it. The 
logical emphasis is on the precondition: if modernisation as such is necessary, then the obstacles to 
it need to be removed. 
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One certain feature is common for almost all examples we found in the Russian press. As described 
in other chapters of this book, modernisation, by definition, is a process. In the light of the analysed 
data this aspect is missing. The single-explanation model diminishes the nature of modernisation as 
continuous project. Instead, it suggests that after fulfilling one certain precondition, modernisation 
can ‘take place’, ‘realise’ or just ‘happen’. This interpretation is obviously an oversimplification, 
but gives more rhetorical significance to the mentioned precondition itself.  
 
As a further conclusion, our findings confirm is that ‘single-explanation’ mode is peculiar to 
Russian political and civil discourse. This may be seen as a manifestation of features of Russian 
mentality called by Prokhorov and Sternin ‘belief in centralised solution of all problems and trust in 
quick’ and ‘simple settlement of complex problems’. This ‘only if’ attitude concerns not only 
discussion on modernisation but is typical for the whole Russian media discourse.  
 
Both the collected data and previous research literature suggest that the modernisation concept was 
not anymore of critical significance after 2012. The concept lost its political weight when it was no 
longer promoted by political leaders. This, however, does not mean that modernisation as a political 
and economic aim would not be a priority for the state anymore but rather that the concept 
describing those aims does not have the political power that it used to have. The media material 
gives us a variety of explanations why modernisation will not take place. We divided these factors 
into three categories: economical, educational and political. A further approach to the possible 
success or failure of modernisation was the ‘Russian way’ pathos which was also used as an 
explanation for the slow progress.  
 
During the year 2014 we witnessed a new phase in political rhetoric, linked to the economic crisis 
of Russia. The crisis was caused by the fall of oil prices and the sanctions that the European Union 
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imposed to Russia as a reaction to Crimean annexation, as well as the Russian counter-sanctions on 
EU products that then followed. In this situation, a new concept of compensation of import 
[importozameshchenie]  was introduced. It is clear that this concept cannot have such a weight than 
modernisation concept has, but the sudden appearance of the concept to the political arena was 
astonishing. The Figure 3 shows how quickly the concept became very frequent in the Russian 
media coverage.  
 
 
Table 3. The frequency of the usage of the expressions modernizatsiia strany or modernizatsiia 
Rossii  in comparison with importozameshchenie in 2013-2105 in Russian media (source: Integrum, 
central media).  
 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
Share of publications where the words are mentioned  (%) 
importozameshchenie modernizatsiia Rossii
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It is curious to see that again, immediately after first appearances of the new political keyword, 
there came out the first ‘single-explanation’ comments. This time the explanations were 
competitiveness of Russian enterprises17 and a new attitude to agriculture18. 
This example confirms that the fluctuation of political concepts is never-ending: new leaders 
introduce new concepts that are either accepted or rejected. We see that modernisation was first 
vastly embraced in the media texts but later abandoned. One reason for the ‘rise and fall’ of the 
concept is that it was closely related to president Medvedev and could not imply innovativeness 
after his term in office. There are possible other political concepts that can conquer the space 
previously reserved for modernisation rhetoric. Apparently, the Russian ‘is possible only if’ way of 
commenting political innovation will continue in the future. 
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